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The past, present and future of a concept
David Grumett
From an historical perspective, practical theology has been understood 
as a theological subdiscipline focused on pastoral activity rather than 
on classic theological sources. It is not, of course, true that pastoral 
concerns exclude detailed work with such sources. Nevertheless, the 
assumption has been widespread that a preference for practice at the 
very least sidelines detailed scholarly engagement with scripture, 
doctrine and tradition. In this article I shall examine why the concept 
of practical theology developed as it did and offer proposals for its 
further development today. It must be stressed at the outset that the 
specific objective will be to consider practical theology as a concept. It 
would be neither possible nor desirable to try to appraise the far larger 
body of work that might, in a loose sense, be designated ‘practical 
theology’ because, for instance, it is has been presented at a practical 
theology conference or appears within the covers of an edited volume 
that has ‘practical theology’ somewhere in its title.
Several dangers may be listed of a purely pastoral understanding of 
practical theology. First, when pastoral activity is disconnected from 
theology’s classic sources, its underlying anthropology and intended 
outcomes necessarily have to be derived from secular discourses, such 
as psychology and sociology. These construct the human person and 
human society in ways that, from a theological perspective, might well 
be questionable. Second, an exclusive focus on pastoral competencies 
can encourage a privatized theology that accepts, or even becomes 
complicit in, the root causes of the problems that these competencies 
purport to address.1 These might include power dynamics, dependency 
relationships and social or ecclesial hierarchy. Third, because of the 
time-lag that usually occurs when scholars of one discipline make 
use of findings produced in another, the findings that are produced 
by such a transfer are likely to be quickly superseded. As a result, 
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practical theologians and the practitioners who draw on their work can 
unwittingly promote outdated personal and social mores.
The fourth danger when practical theology develops a solely 
pastoral focus is a lack of relation to embodied, material life. When 
practical theology depends on the frequently abstract constructions of 
human flourishing derived from psychology or sociology, it is unclear 
what substantive contribution the subject is able to make to addressing 
the practical questions that Christians and others face in their daily 
lives. For example, what and how should Christians eat, given the 
many negative impacts that diet makes on ecology and health? How 
should Christians understand bodily impairment, in view of the 
increasing human capacity to make technological interventions to 
compensate what might be viewed as natural defects? In what kinds of 
domestic configurations should Christians live, in a socially-atomised 
world in which many kinds of relationship are possible? Pressing 
questions like these are fundamentally practical but not intrinsically 
pastoral.
In order to address new topics such as these, practical theology 
requires new and specifically theological methodology and 
content. Indeed, at a time when its social and ecclesial contexts are 
transforming, this is more important than ever. Practical theologians 
need to give new attention to concrete, lived practices, as unfolded in 
Christian scripture and tradition, in order to generate new discourses 
of relevance to the questions and problems of present-day society. 
This is especially true of those based in universities, where, despite 
cutbacks, practical theology is still publicly funded through research 
grants, teaching grants and other subsidies. In such institutions above 
all, practical theology needs to speak to a wide public.2
Practical theology: origins and continuities
The term die praktische Theologie is traceable to Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and notably to his Brief Outline of the theological 
curriculum to be taught in the newly-founded University of Berlin. 
Now the Humboldt-Universität, this was a liberal, state-run institution 
rather than one operated by the Church or private citizens. Moreover, 
it was an institution in which teachers were also researchers, and 
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teaching was therefore shaped by research. The Brief Outline 
constitutes the first programmatic reflection on the place and nature 
of practical theology in the modern university. Schleiermacher states 
that practical theology should be covered following ‘philosophical 
theology’. (By this, he meant a conceptually clear and internally 
consistent theology with general applicability rather than relevance 
only within a specific church.) Practical theology is also to follow 
‘historical theology’, which Schleiermacher construed to encompass 
biblical studies, doctrine and ethics.3 He thereby saw these other 
subdisciplines as providing practical theology with its source material, 
which it then employed to shape church life.
Schleiermacher’s syllabus for his biennial lectures on practical 
theology offers a good impression of the content of the subject as he 
saw it. Delivered from 1812 to 1833, these lectures were posthumously 
collated and published by Jacob Frerichs.4 In them is outlined a 
distinct subdiscipline encompassing, in order, worship, song, prayer, 
preaching, catechesis, mission, pastoral care and ecclesiology. Because 
the Frerichs text was compiled from lecture notes it unfortunately 
includes few citations, which makes it difficult to trace the elements of 
the practical theology that is proposed to specific scriptural exegesis 
or doctrinal expositions, whether by Schleiermacher or others. What is 
notable, however, is the dependence of practical theology on the other 
theological subdisciplines.
As practical theology spread, in recent decades, to English 
universities, it was designated from the outset as pastoral theology.5 
In Scotland, however, its birth and development were earlier and 
different, with Schleiermacher’s terminology, course content and order 
of exposition all closely followed. Appraisal of the development of 
practical theology as a subdiscipline in Scotland is therefore important 
for the current discussion. The Brief Outline probably informed the 
shaping of the curriculum, having been translated into English as early 
as 1850 by the London Congregationalist lawyer William Farrer and 
published in Edinburgh.6 Moreover, Die Praktische Theologie was in 
the theological libraries at Edinburgh, Glasgow and St Andrews.7
From 1921 there existed within New College, Edinburgh – which 
was, at that time, a United Free Church of Scotland college – a 
Department of Apologetics, Christian Ethics and Practical Theology.8 
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In 1924 the first course in practical theology was taught by the 
Reverend Bruce Nicol. The syllabus included preaching, worship and 
the sacraments, pastoral care, catechesis, church administration, and 
missiology at home and abroad. In 1927, Daniel Lamont was appointed 
Professor of Apologetics, Christian Ethics and Practical Theology at 
New College, with this position replacing a previous Professorship in 
Apologetics and Pastoral Theology. The process by which the College 
chair became a University chair was completed in 1939.9 This was 
in the wake of the 1929 union of the majority of the United Free 
Church presbyteries with the established Church of Scotland, which 
resulted in the chairs of the United Free colleges – New College; 
Trinity College, Glasgow; and Christ’s College, Aberdeen – being 
brought within their respective Universities.10 Practical theology at 
Edinburgh was thus placed on a similar footing to that established 
by Schleiermacher in Berlin. William Tindal, James Blackie, Duncan 
Forrester, William Storrar and Oliver O’Donovan followed Lamont 
in the Edinburgh chair. For a time, a Chair of Practical Theology and 
Christian Ethics was maintained at St Andrews, which from 1958 to 
1987 was occupied notably by James Whyte.11
To what extent was this early Scottish development of practical 
theology faithful to Schleiermacher’s vision? Schleiermacher viewed 
practical theology as more than ministerial training or pastoral 
formation. Rather, it was an academic subject deemed worthy of 
inclusion in the university curriculum in consequence of its scientific 
character and clearly defined relationships with proximate cognate 
disciplines.12 Schleiermacher’s vision of the university setting of 
practical theology demanded of practical theologians equally high 
standards of source criticism, evidence and argument as those found 
in other disciplines and in the other theological subdisciplines. For 
Schleiermacher, to say that practical theology cannot be expected 
to attain similar standards due to being grounded in life experience 
or common sense would have been effectively to banish it from the 
university. In Scotland, however, as has just been explained, practical 
theology originated not in a public research university but in church 
colleges. In this setting, pastoral imperatives understandably came to 
weigh more heavily on the minds of teachers and students than those 
of research. This was especially the case in Glasgow, to the extent 
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that the University Chair in Christian Ethics and Practical Theology 
existed for a mere six years, its sole occupant being Arthur Gossip. 
Established in 1939, it was abolished in 1945 after the Church of 
Scotland’s General Assembly determined that, because of the nature 
of its subject and the needs of ministry students, the chair should be 
based in Trinity College rather than the University.13 However, in 
Edinburgh and St Andrews, as has been seen, Schleiermacher’s vision 
was more fully realised in the late 1930s, as the practical theology 
located in the United Free colleges became fully integrated into the 
University.
Within this university setting, the teachers of practical theology 
were mostly clergy and the bulk of the students were ministry 
students. In this context, the dependence of practical theology on the 
other theological subdisciplines was unlikely to be questioned, with 
this intra-theological dependence naturally more comfortable for both 
teacher and student than a reliance on non-theological disciplines. Thus 
the ecclesial orientation of practical theology persisted as established 
by Schleiermacher, on the grounds that the Church (understood as a 
community or association, not necessarily as an historic institution) 
provided the locus for shared religious feeling.14 This component of 
his blueprint for practical theology has continued into recent times.15
What may be said about the status of practical theology in 
this context? This is a vexed question in the interpretation of 
Schleiermacher. He is sometimes quoted, correctly – and especially 
by practical theologians! – as describing practical theology as the 
‘crown’ (die Krone) of the entire theological enterprise. This echoes, 
probably unintentionally, the medieval regal imagery of theology 
as itself the queen of the sciences, and might be taken to suggest 
that Schleiermacher regarded practical theology as superior to the 
other theological subdisciplines because of its ecclesial orientation. 
But in his text the crown metaphor is closely preceded by another: 
that of philosophy as the ‘root’ (die Wurzel) of all theology.16 This 
pairing of metaphors suggests an alternative, organic interpretation of 
practical theology as a ‘crown’: not as superior to the other theological 
subdisciplines but as emerging from them in a similar way to that 
in which the crown of a tree is formed by its branches and cannot 
exist independently of them. If this is true, then Schleiermacher did 
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not favour practical theology above the other subdisciplines quite as 
much as is sometimes supposed. Indeed, as has been seen, practical 
theology could fit well within an institutional context where theology 
with strong doctrinal and scriptural elements was also the object of 
study and research.
Practical theology in Church and academy
So far in this article, the concept of practical theology and its practical 
outworking have been considered up until the recent past. Its ecclesial 
context has been prominent. The notion that practical theology should 
be ecclesially oriented is a useful corrective to the idea that it is the 
sole concern of clergy and ordinands. To affirm that the audience 
for practical theology is the whole Church is to acknowledge that 
ministry is an activity of that whole Church, not just of clergy and 
other ministers.17 Nevertheless, in today’s climate it is necessary to 
consider whether even this broadened understanding of the audience 
of practical theology is sustainable. Continuing with the Scottish case, 
between 2002 and 2012 the Church of Scotland recorded a drop in 
communicant numbers of 27%.18 Elsewhere in Britain and Europe 
church membership is also falling, if not at quite the same precipitous 
rate. In view of these declining numbers it seems increasingly unlikely, 
either in Scotland or elsewhere in Europe, that the churches alone will 
provide an audience of sufficient size to sustain practical theology 
as a university subdiscipline. Moreover, and more significantly from 
a doctrinal viewpoint, the exclusive identification of the Church to 
which practical theology is oriented with visible church institutions 
is theologically unsound. I shall return to this important point later.19
It has already been recognized that practical theology might 
possess a broader remit than the ecclesial. In particular, the linkage 
of practical theology with Christian ethics in the course descriptors 
and job titles of the Scottish universities suggests that any topic of 
Christian ethical concern might, or even should, generate a practical 
theological response. Christian ethics is thereby seen as having the 
function of orienting practical theology to the topics it engages, just as 
Christian ethics is itself oriented as a result of its own prior interaction 
with systematic theology.20 Positively, this opens the possibility that 
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practical theology might study and critique aspects of the secular social 
and political order directly, rather than via their significance for the 
Church.21 Moreover, the dependence on Christian ethics (and thereby, 
indirectly, on systematic theology) that this model supposes roots 
practical theology in normative, analytical theological discourse.22 
In so far as this prevents practical theology from becoming a mere 
function of ongoing empirical activity or a commentary on such 
activity, such dependence is to be welcomed.
By allowing direct social and political critique, this model 
of practical theology’s function and audience is undoubtedly an 
improvement on one that equates practical theology with ministerial 
activity, even the ministerial activity of the whole church. Nevertheless, 
it presents the topics that practical theology addresses as determined 
by Christian ethics. Moreover, if the topics of Christian ethics are 
determined by systematic theology, this determination is duplicated 
and practice is thereby doubly prevented from generating its own 
topics for reflection.
The idea that the fullest and most accurate understanding of 
reality will derive from the most abstract reflection has an ancient 
lineage, which is traced back standardly to Plato’s Republic. There, 
the Guardians reign as philosopher rulers on the justifiable grounds 
that they have privileged access to the knowledge derived from the 
forms, which for Plato included both the content of knowledge and 
the motivation to act in accordance with that knowledge.23 Platonic 
epistemology is frequently criticized on the obvious grounds that it is 
undemocratic and presents the visible world as a murky, contingent 
illusion. This is to neglect, however, the alternative understanding 
of truth that a more Aristotelian Plato presents in his later dialogues, 
including the Philebus. There, the good for human life is not abstract, 
contemplative knowledge of the forms, but the rightly-ordered, 
‘mixed’ life in which different types of knowledge, including even 
true opinion, are synthesized in a ‘road which leads to the good’.24 
Pure reason, in contrast, is no better than pure pleasure, lacking self-
sufficiency or the capacity for perfection.25 Even for Plato, therefore, 
the separation of theory from practice and the exaltation of theory 
above practice on the grounds that theory gives better access to truth 
are by no means as clear-cut as is typically supposed. His reasons for 
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discomfort about such a clear-cut distinction, being cross-disciplinary, 
have wider implications, including for systematic theology. They 
suggest a far greater mutuality between systematic and practical 
theology, which will be developed in the following section.
Practical theology’s intra-theological dependence is problematic, 
however, not only because of the distorted conception of the theory-
practice relation on which it rests. At least as serious is that this 
dependence prepares ground for its more insidious subordination to 
the non-theological disciplines and especially to the social sciences. 
Practical theology may then, wrongly, be reduced to an essentially 
empirical activity in which social injustice, economic inequality or 
other problems are surveyed and responses provided that broadly 
accord with Christian and secular morals. While such exercises 
undoubtedly manifest the Christian vocation to social responsibility, 
they are unlikely to be specifically theological in either content or 
methodology.
This relationship of practical theology to the social sciences 
and other empirical disciplines may usefully be compared with the 
relationship between theology and other disciplines prescribed in 
the medieval university. Theology, along with philosophy, was to be 
studied only after other subjects had been mastered.26 The modern 
correlates of these other subjects roughly included English and other 
languages (grammar), argumentative subjects in the humanities such 
as history and political theory (rhetoric), mathematics and statistics 
(arithmetic) and performance art (music). These other subjects 
were viewed as intellectual preparation for theology rather than as 
substitutes for theology when the texts and ideas proper to it became 
too difficult, or as subjects that translated the findings of theology into 
terms that were more easily comprehensible. Indeed, during the High 
Middle Ages theologians who forsook theology for other subjects 
were often portrayed as dogs returning to vomit.27 Although vomit is a 
natural biological product and part of life’s rich tapestry, the analogy 
suggests a retreat from the ruminative, synthetic and intellectual task 
that is proper to theology, and especially, as I shall argue, to practical 
theology. In Philipp Rosemann’s words, the scholar who effected such 
a retreat was seen as ‘regurgitating intellectual food that has already 
been digested’.28
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The idea of practice
What are the alternatives to understanding practical theology as 
dependent either on other theological subdisciplines or on disciplines 
located elsewhere in the university? The neglected possibility I wish 
to pursue is that practice, far from being an outworking of theology, 
might provide the necessary setting for theology, doctrine and 
Christian ethics, and even be their precondition. Before advancing 
further, however, the definition of practice that is in use should be 
clarified. Notably, many discussions of practical theology do not 
differentiate it clearly from pastoral theology, or suggest that such 
differentiation is not even possible.29 Another oft-repeated claim is 
that because different views exist of what practical theology is, the 
subject is impossible to define. This is unconvincing: just because 
different conceptions of a subject exist, it does not follow that every 
possible understanding is equally valid, nor that there should be no 
constructive debate between holders of competing understandings 
about the merits of their differing conceptions.
At a pragmatic level there is nothing wrong with an inclusive 
understanding of what counts as practical theology, not least because 
such an understanding recognizes the category to be broader than 
that of pastoral theology.30 Nevertheless, conceptual clarity about 
the nature of an intellectual enterprise will aid and direct its further 
development. Because of the conceptual vagueness just referred to, 
for a clearer understanding of practice it is necessary to look outside 
the modern subdiscipline of practical theology to the work of the 
Thomist-inspired philosopher and Roman Catholic convert Alasdair 
MacIntyre. In After Virtue, MacIntyre offers the definition of practice 
as: ‘any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity 
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that 
form of activity’.31 Although this definition is often cited, its full 
implications, both positive and negative, have not been explored. It 
is theologically suggestive because it does not restrict the category of 
practice to ecclesial practice, potentially encompassing both ecclesial 
practices and secular practices, including practices that might trespass 
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across this distinction. A second valuable aspect of the definition is its 
historicity. MacIntyre writes: ‘To enter into a practice is to enter into 
a relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also 
with those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those 
whose achievements extend the reach of the practice to its present 
point.’32 Every practice has a history, and every practitioner stands 
within an historical tradition. This includes the practical knowledge of 
technical skills as well as the internal goods, whether cultural, ethical 
or communal, by which a practice is characterized and sustained. To 
take an example, the history of the practice of baking encompasses 
the hard-won technical abilities to crush grain efficiently and to apply 
sufficient heat to dough, as well as goods such as the settlement and 
cultivation of land on which the grain may be grown, and also the acts 
of hospitality and sharing that bread makes possible. 
By attending to practice’s internal goods, MacIntyre contests 
the instrumentalist reduction of value to external goods, such as the 
income generated if the bread is sold. Nevertheless, his definition of 
practice is theologically problematic on two counts. The definition 
quoted above was, in fact, incomplete. Following his reference to 
‘trying to achieve […] standards of excellence’, MacIntyre continues 
by stating that practices are engaged in ‘with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended’.33 Humans, on his view, 
may develop their moral capacities and ethical knowledge by their own 
efforts, without any need of grace. The first problem with MacIntyre’s 
concept of practice can now be seen: it is too deeply implicated in an 
agonal Aristotelian ethical framework that iterates the Homeric warrior 
tradition, lauding the attainment of excellence and the acquisition of 
social and cultural capital.34 Strikingly, MacIntyre argues that virtuous 
practice requires justice, courage and truthfulness. He does not regard 
humans as fallible creatures inhabiting a fragile world in which, rather 
than striving for justice, they hope for mercy; instead of fostering 
courage, they seek protection; in place of maintaining truthfulness, 
they repent of their falsity. At this point we see MacIntyre influenced 
by a traditionalist Roman Catholicism that, in deference to Aristotle, 
posits a realm of ‘pure nature’ within which humans may pursue at 
least some goods unaided by grace.
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The second theological problem with MacIntyre’s idea of practice 
is that it is epistemologically self-referential. As already recognized, 
MacIntyre rightly celebrates the goods internal to a practice in order 
to show how a practice is more than a set of technical skills exercised 
in order to obtain goods or to secure other external ends. But the 
theologian who wishes to probe the relation between doctrine and 
practice more deeply will require more than this. Is there, in fact, a 
proper externality to the goods of practices that are pursued within 
communities, and especially within Christian communities? In other 
words, is there a proper dualism of practice and doctrine?
At the level of routine daily functioning, practices such as buildings 
maintenance, catering and gardening are constitutive of the life of local 
churches.35 They are preconditions for inhabiting a shared space and 
welcoming others into that space, as well as being activities in which 
a distinctively ecclesial life, which is egalitarian and communal, is 
lived out. Notwithstanding the current popularity of communitarian 
ecclesiologies, however, ecclesial life should not be viewed in 
postmodern terms as only an end in itself. However important the 
shared life that churches make possible might be, churches are also 
called to recognize and proclaim external truths beyond themselves. 
These truths are doctrinal and have objective theological content.
From an academic perspective, theologians need to consider 
more seriously the possibility that theology, including doctrine, is not 
simply made possible by practice, but rather, that theology depends 
on practice for its specific content.36 As Craig Dykstra puts it in an 
incisive critical response to MacIntyre: ‘Practices bear more than 
moral weight; they also bear epistemological weight. […] Engagement 
in certain practices may give rise to new knowledge.’37 Sarah Coakley 
makes a similar point more emphatically: there are ‘theological 
insights available only through practices’.38 In other words, practice 
is not simply one possible way to theological understanding, but a 
condition for such understanding. The Rule of Benedict provides a 
good example of this. In Benedict’s community, the disciplines that 
governed the everyday material practices of worship, eating, clothing 
and work – which were themselves derived, in large part, from 
scripture – shaped theological discourse. For example, the brothers are 
to follow instructions immediately, thereby proving their obedience to 
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the Lord.39 They are to sleep clothed and with a light burning in order 
always to be ready to respond to God’s command.40 All the property 
of the monastery is to be regarded as sacred, like the vessels of the 
altar.41 Guests are to be welcomed with great humility as if they were 
Christ himself, who is received in their persons.42 These and other 
connections between practice, ethics and doctrine are entirely missed 
by MacIntyre, who presents Benedict as a latter-day Aristotelian, 
despite the radically different and highly specific Christian character 
of Benedict’s community.43
From practice to theology
As already argued, practical theology in the present day needs to 
engage varieties of practice far wider than ministerial competences 
or church life. It might potentially encompass any complex, fitting 
and perennial dimension of human life and flourishing: hospitality, 
ecology, cooking, eating, drinking, clothing, gardening, travel, 
agriculture and architecture, to name but a few. The most ethically and 
doctrinally generative areas of practice are likely to be those for which 
there exist a tradition of biblical reflection, whether literal narrative, 
allegorical imagery, moral instruction, eschatological representation 
or some combination of these. If such biblical witness is present, 
elements of a lived tradition of how the particular practice has been 
conceived in specifically Christian terms are likely to be retrievable: 
few of the contents of scripture have not been put to practical service 
by Christian communities at some time or other. Finally, if scripture 
and tradition may be brought to bear on a specific practice, it is 
probable that the practice has contributed to the formation of doctrine, 
whether of God, Christ or the Spirit, creation, reconciliation, the last 
things or some other topic.
As the list of practices just offered in the previous paragraph makes 
clear, to call for a wider understanding of Christian practice is also 
to call Christian theologians to re-engage with culture. Others have 
already rightly argued that practical theologians need to engage with 
specific forms of popular culture such as film, music and media.44 At 
a general level, however, Graham Ward defines culture as a ‘symbolic 
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world-view, embedded, reproduced and modified through specific 
social practices’.45 In order to understand culture, Ward avers, we need 
to remain alive to ‘mediations of the real’ that point beyond the mere 
facts of a practice and their description. In so doing, there will be 
enacted a ‘new engagement of the theologically informed practices 
of the Christian with the larger social world that contextualises him 
or her’.46 The humanities disciplines will be crucial collaborative 
partners in the task of reading culture, more so than those of the social 
sciences that practical theologians have frequently favoured. By re-
engaging with the humanities, practical theologians have the potential 
to retrieve theologically rich deposits of prose, poetry, performance, 
image and artefact to support this endeavour, thereby performing an 
integrative function in the academy – including by acquiring relevant 
specialist knowledge in other disciplines where this intersects their 
theological knowledge.47
An example of how scripture, tradition and doctrine might 
interact in the context of a particular practice is disability. This might 
seem an odd choice, being supposed to be a practice in which few 
people engage directly and that therefore possesses limited general 
significance. But as with any practice, to begin to address disability 
theologically is to begin to question assumptions about its definition, 
significance and extent.
Disability is a good example of a tradition in which the practitioner 
is, in part, already ‘at home’, if involuntarily.48 Over the past twenty 
years, the topic has rightly captured the interest of increasing numbers 
of theologians and biblical scholars. A key early work was Nancy 
Eiesland’s study The Disabled God, in which she contended that 
classical Christology has frequently been predicated upon a view 
of humanity as normatively able-bodied. Such anthropomorphisms, 
Eiesland argued, needed to be deconstructed if doctrine were to be 
freed from distortion. In fact, Christ experienced limitation in his 
incarnation, and even when risen still bore the wounds inflicted on 
him when disabled on the Cross.49 For Eiesland, practical theology 
thus had a purgative function with regard to doctrine, impelling an 
unknowing of previously unchallenged tenets. Moreover, Eiesland’s 
work is helpful for the present discussion because it was founded 
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on a personal protest against pastoral theology, which, she believed, 
assumed or even produced recipients who are powerless and 
marginalized and who accept pain without demur.50
But practical theology also performs constructive theological and 
doctrinal roles, as in the recent work of Jeremy Schipper.51 This has 
demonstrated that people with disabilities are ubiquitous in scripture, 
where they are presented in a range of ways. Schipper counsels against 
the attempt to identify a single ‘scriptural’ view of disability. Rather, 
what emerges is a large collection of texts and images through which 
to think. Some figures with a disability, notably eunuchs, occupy 
positions of privilege and power, whereas others, such as lepers, are 
outcasts. Schipper also shows that significant resources have been lost 
in translation. The suffering servant of Isaiah 52:13–53:12, for instance 
– of marred appearance, beyond human semblance – is a figure with 
prophetic agency whose significance was probably due to a disability 
that subsequent interpreters have usually ignored. Schipper’s work 
shows that what is likely to emerge from a biblically-shaped practical 
theology of disability is not so much a coherent ‘theology of disability’ 
but a constellation of ideas and issues that connect with a range of 
doctrinal perspectives. For instance, whether Isaiah’s disabled, 
suffering servant is seen as possessing agency or suffering passivity 
has large implications for Christology and soteriology.
If practice thereby generates reasoning, then practice need not itself 
be comprehensively explicable nor justifiable on rational grounds. 
This is because such explication or justification will ultimately be 
grounded in the practice for which it is sought. The notion that the 
quest for such foundational justifications of practice is futile is found in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, in which 
practice is presented as being, as it were, simply there. The very idea 
of attempting to explain (erklären) practice, Wittgenstein suggests, is 
misguided. The most that might be hoped for is that a practice be 
made plausible to like-minded people. What then of the practitioner 
herself? She might give up or change a practice if she comes to see 
that it depends on an error. Yet religious practices, Wittgenstein avers, 
are an exception to this.52 They seem to be deeper-rooted and harder 
to subject to rational interrogation than mere customs or conventions. 
They possess, at the very least, a stubborn remainder that cannot and 
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should not stand or fall on the basis of its conformity or otherwise 
with theory.
Frazer himself was, unlike Wittgenstein, highly sceptical about 
the religious practices he presented. When linking them implicitly or 
explicitly with Christian practices, his aim was to denigrate Christianity 
rather than to offer a new understanding of it.53 Wittgenstein rightly 
chides Frazer for his narrowness of vision and his failure to recognise 
that the ‘principle according to which these practices are ordered is 
much more general […] and we find it in ourselves’.54 All humans 
are ceremonious animals, Wittgenstein contends, whether they 
be adherents of Classical religious cults, followers of British folk 
religion, or ordinary people today, whether Christian or not.
How might the practical theologian begin to understand and 
evaluate practice with reference to ethics and doctrine? Wittgenstein 
refers to ‘arranging the factual material so that we can easily pass 
from one part to another and have a clear view of it – showing it 
in a “perspicuous” way [einer „übersichtlichen“ Darstellung]’.55 
An understanding of a practice may be gained by perceiving the 
connections between its different associated elements and glimpsing 
something of its ‘inner nature’ – that is, of the circumstances that 
are omitted from the formal account of the practice, which might 
be termed its ‘spirit’ [Geist]. The act of understanding a practice is 
thereby not rationally deductive but synthetic and intuitive.
Wittgenstein’s acceptance of practice as being ‘simply there’ 
precludes hasty rational deconstructions of practice. It also underlies 
his view of practice as sometimes, at least initially, strange and 
disconcerting, and as requiring time to grow into. Yet practice might 
well demand greater theoretical interrogation than Wittgenstein 
allows. In particular, practices that are inherited might well need to 
be brought into critical, transformative dialogue with Christian ethics 
if they appear to be exploitative or unjust. In order to frame such a 
dialogue, an Hegelian corrective needs to be applied to the notion that, 
when practice and theory ultimately come into conflict, the inevitable 
victor must be practice.
Many would assume that, for Hegel, the situation would be the 
reverse: that theory trumps and dissolves practice, even when the two 
are not in conflict. In fact, he greatly respected religious practice and 
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all that came with it. On an attentive reading, his mature philosophy is 
reducible neither to a Rightist transcendent metaphysics nor a Leftist 
exhaustion of reason in experience. Rather, the triple mediations of 
nature, spirit and idea must be held together in an identity that does 
not simplistically exclude non-identity.56 The result is a perpetually 
re-enacted mediation which, as such, requires for its subjects real, 
finite humans who are spiritual and rational. Moreover, religion is not 
concerned merely with the inward, infinite life, requiring equally the 
contingency of external, practical life. Hegel writes that, in religion, 
‘infinite life now also develops itself outwardly; for the worldly life led 
by the subject also has its foundation on this substantial consciousness 
[of its essence, and of knowing itself in God], and the ways and means 
by which the subject determines its purposes in worldly life depend 
upon the consciousness of its essential truth’.57 Put far more simply, 
ideas and spirituality shape real life. In the finite, directed mode of 
being that is determinate religion, practice has the specific role of 
bringing ‘to consciousness for the individual as something objective’ 
what is ‘there in human inwardness’. Furthermore, in practice ‘what 
is found within the individual is developed so that one knows it as the 
truth in which one abides’.58 That is to say, spirit requires objective 
realization and recognition in practice.
Conclusion
This Hegelian correction of Wittgenstein opens the way to a richer 
account of practice than one limited to pastoral and professional 
ministries, whether in churches or other organizations. Practical 
theology is now seen to be rooted in transformative ethical activity 
that, although historically linked to Christian representation, might 
now have become detached from such representation. By addressing 
aspects of daily material life that the other theological subdisciplines 
have overlooked, the practical theologian will begin to recover the 
Augustinian truth that the boundaries of the real Church are not 
coterminous with those of the institutional churches. Rather, forms of 
implicitly churchly activity requiring theological interpretation may be 
found in secular society and culture. Furthermore, if, as Augustine also 
believed, the whole of human and material life is graced, all apparently 
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mundane activities and truths possess theological significance. It could 
be protested that, by following such a path, practical theology forsakes 
what should be its native institutional community. Alternatively, one 
might better contend that where practical theology is, there is the 
Church. By holding theology and practice in creative tension, rather 
than by seeking to dissolve the mutually generative polarity between 
them, the practical theologian may find and interrogate doctrine, ethics 
and traditions in new places.
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